(Ass): Managing Business Operations

Page 1 of 22UNIVERSITY OF WEST LONDONThe Claude Littner Business SchoolManaging Business OperationsBA5FE37E/BA50037EData Analysis Case StudyDate: Week 11 – Week 14Time Allowed 4 WeeksDeadline: 23rd January 2022Instructions to candidates:1. Answer ALL questions, referring to the given Case Study, during the fourweeks and submit by the given deadline on Week 14, on TuirnItIn.2. Your answer must be specific to the Case Study. General answers will not beawarded marks.3. You are encouraged to refer to external sources and references to back upyour arguments.4. You must label the answers for every question correctly and note the exactword counts for every answer.5. Questions and Case Study maybe changed for mitigation and resitsubmissions.Page 2 of 22Case Study of StarbucksAwake as usual at 4:00 a.m., Starbucks CEO Howard Schultz sipped a cup of TributeBlend coffee as he reviewed the galley proofs for his latest memoir—Onward: HowStarbucks Fought for Its Life without Losing Its Soul. The quiet surroundings gave himan opportunity to reflect on the remarkable ride that had brought him and Starbucks toJanuary 2011, the beginning of the company’s fortieth year.During those four decades, Starbucks had grown from a single location in Seattle,Washington, to a multibillion-dollar enterprise that operated more than 17,000 retailstores in fifty countries. Originally selling only coffee beans and ground coffee, it hadadded to its offerings prepared coffee, Italian-style espresso beverages, cold blendeddrinks, food items, premium teas, and beverage-related accessories and equipment.Outside of its retail stores, consumers could purchase Starbucks-branded beans,instant coffee, tea, and ready-to-drink beverages in tens of thousands of grocery andmass merchandise stores around the world (Starbucks Corporation – IR Home, 2021).As he reviewed the company’s many successes, Schultz remembered the words hehad spoken to Starbucks’ partners just days before as they celebrated their bestholiday season ever: “We have won in many ways, but I feel it’s so important to remindus all of how fleeting success and winning can be.” (Miller, 2011).HistoryWhen Starbucks was founded in 1971, coffee consumption in the United States hadbeen on the decline for nearly a decade. Most American coffee drinkers drank homebrewed Folgers, Maxwell House, or Nescafé—grocery store brands of light roastcoffee with the smooth flavour generally preferred by Americans. Away from home,Page 3 of 22they ordered coffee with a meal at a diner or restaurant, or on the go from a fast-foodoutlet, convenience store, or gas station.However, in a few neighbourhoods in San Francisco and New York, small localcoffeehouses and specialty coffee roasters such as Peet’s had recently beenestablished. Starbucks was created in this mould with the aim to roast and sell greatcoffee.By 1982, Starbucks had five retail outlets that sold beans and supplies for brewingcoffee at home, but not prepared beverages. It also had a roasting facility and awholesale business. This growth attracted the attention of Schultz, then the vicepresident of the American subsidiary of Hammarplast, a Swedish housewarescompany that made plastic cone coffee filters for home coffee brewing. Schultz wentto Seattle to find out why a small company called Starbucks ordered more of thesefilters than any other customer. He liked what he found and joined Starbucks later thatyear as director of retail operations.During a business trip to Milan, Italy, the following year, Schultz was struck by thecity’s ubiquitous espresso bars. The bars served well-prepared espresso and brewedcoffee and were important places for conversation and socializing. Schultz realizedthat America lacked similar places offering high-quality coffee in a comfortable settingfor meeting and relaxing. He left Milan with a determination to create such anestablishment in America. Schultz later dubbed this “the third place” beyond home andwork, a term he borrowed from The Great, Good Place, a book in which sociologistRay Oldenburg laments the decline of traditional American community meeting placeslike country stores and soda fountains (Oldenburg, 1999).Starbucks’ management, however, was not receptive to the idea of selling prepareddrinks, turning Schultz down with the explanation that getting into the “restaurantPage 4 of 22business” would distract the company from its core assets and activities: roasting andselling coffee beans.In 1986 Schultz left Starbucks to open Il Giornale, a café selling espresso, espressobased drinks such as cappuccino, and food items, in addition to whole-bean coffee. IlGiornale attracted 1,000 daily customers within six months, prompting Schultz to opentwo more locations. Despite his success, Schultz faced scepticism from investors—when he was trying to raise $1.25 million to fund his expansion, Schultz was turneddown by 217 of the 242 potential investors he approached, many of whom expressedconcern that he had no patent on his dark roast, no special access to coffee beans,and no way to prevent someone else from imitating his concept (Thompson andGamble, 2010).In 1987 Il Giornale acquired Starbucks, including its retail outlets, coffee roastingfacilities, and wholesale operation. Schultz rebranded the existing stores with theStarbucks name. The first Il Giornale had been a virtual copy of a Milanese espressobar, complete with bow-tied waiters, a stand-up coffee bar, and sleek Europeanfurniture. By contrast, the new Starbucks-branded locations were decorated in earthtones with overstuffed chairs, wood floors, and cosy fireplaces that encouragedpatrons to linger and relax (Simon, 2009)Starbucks coffee was different from the coffee most Americans were used toconsuming. In addition to being much more expensive, Starbucks coffee had a tasteunlike typical American coffee. Starbucks roasted its beans in its own carefullycontrolled facility, where they were given a robust European-style flavour derisivelycalled “Charbucks” by some (Simon, 2009), and then shipped them whole to its storeswhere they were ground immediately before brewing to ensure maximum freshness,flavour, and aroma. Starbucks espresso drinks were also prepared in a different way:a barista, a master of both the art and science of coffee production, “pulled” shots ofespresso by hand using a La Marzocco machine, steamed milk to just the rightPage 5 of 22temperature, and scooped elegant dollops of foam for cappuccinos, all while chattingwith customers about the different varieties of Starbucks coffee (Simon, 2009).In a nod to the heart of coffee culture, Starbucks invented a quasi-Italian lingo for itsdrink sizes (short, tall, grande, and venti) and the drinks themselves (e.g., CaramelMacchiato and Frappuccino). No matter how a customer ordered, counter clerks weretrained to repeat the order using the correct terms in the Starbucks-specified order.Their tone was described as “not one of rebuke, but nevertheless most customerslearn to avoid the implied correction by stating their order in the way that helpsStarbucks’s operations…. Indeed, for some customers, getting the order right is anaspiration, a small victory on the way to the office (Frei, 2006).”By 1996, the Starbucks mermaid logo appeared on more than 1,000 stores. Starbucksselected its locations carefully, targeting areas with large numbers of wealthy andhighly educated professional workers. These were the new American elite—dubbed“bobos” (bourgeois bohemians) by commentator David Brooks—who usedconsumption as a way to distinguish themselves from the less enlightened masses(Brooks, 2001).Soon, more and more American consumers aspired to emulate the coffee drinkersthat were first attracted to Starbucks. “Customers believed that their grande lattesdemonstrated that they were better than others—cooler, richer, and moresophisticated. As long as they could get all of this for the price of a cup of coffee, evenan inflated one, they eagerly handed over their money, three and four dollars at a clip(Simon, 2009).” As Roly Morris, one of the team that helped bring Starbucks toCanada, observed, “We’re offering a lifestyle product… that transcends the usualbarrier. Maybe you can’t swing a Beamer [BMW]… but most people can treatthemselves to a great cup of coffee (Simon, 2009).”Starbucks Expands (1996–2006)Page 6 of 22Beginning in 1996 Starbucks embarked on a significant wave of growth byconcurrently executing two initiatives: (1) selling Starbucks products through massdistribution channels, and (2) dramatically expanding its retail footprint. Schultz playedan important role in both initiatives, first as CEO until 2000, and thereafter as chairmanand chief global strategist.Selling Through Mass Distribution ChannelsThe first product Starbucks sold through mass distribution channels in the UnitedStates was its bottled Frappuccino coffee drink, brought to market through a jointventure in 1996 with Pepsi-Cola North America. The arrangement drew on Pepsi’sexpertise in managing store supply and demand but allowed Starbucks to retaincontrol over the development and sale of its products. According to Theodore, S.,(2007). around the same time, the company partnered with Dreyer’s to produce apremium coffee-flavoured ice cream. Soon after, Starbucks began to test marketStarbucks-branded coffee beans and ground specialty coffee in grocery stores andsupermarkets. In 1998, approximately a year after market testing, Starbucks coffeewas on the shelf in approximately 3,500 supermarkets in ten West Coast cities(AllBusiness, 1998).In 1998 Starbucks sold approximately $50 million of whole bean and ground specialtycoffee in grocery stores (compared to approximately $1 billion in sales for MaxwellHouse and $1.3 billion for Folgers in the same year). By 2010 Starbucks coffee salesin grocery stores had grown to $500 million (a 10 percent increase over the previousyear) (TheFreeLibrary, 1998). In the same year, the sales of Folgers, the market shareleader, fell by 2.1 percent. The sales of Maxwell House, the number two ground coffeebrand, grew by only 2.8 percent to approximately $1.5 billion (Chu, 2020).In addition to moving into mass distribution channels, Starbucks also expanded itsproduct distribution through licensing agreements. It concluded an agreement in 1995Page 7 of 22to provide coffee on all United Airlines flights, and in 2001 agreed to provide Starbuckscoffee for all restaurants, room service, and meeting rooms at Hyatt hotels. By 2008,16 percent of Starbucks revenues came from sources other than its company-ownedretail stores (Starbucks, 2008).Dramatically Expanding Retail StoresBy 1996 Starbucks had opened just over 1,000 stores. Within five years, that numberhad grown to nearly 5,000. In 2007 Starbucks operated 15,000 stores and in the sameyear publicly announced a goal to open 40,000 locations worldwide, with 20,000 in theUnited States alone. (In the same year, McDonald’s operated approximately 14,000restaurants in the United States and 31,000 locations worldwide (McDonalds, 2007).The expansion of Starbucks attracted media attention, not all of which was positive.On April 1, 1996, National Public Radio aired a satirical report that “Starbucks will soonannounce their plans to build a pipeline costing more than a billion dollars, a pipelinethousands of miles long from Seattle to the East Coast, with branches to Boston andNew York and Washington, a pipeline that will carry freshly roasted coffee beans(Pendergrast, 1999).” The Onion lampooned the growth of Starbucks stores in 1998with the mock headline, “Starbucks, the nation’s largest coffee-shop chain, continuedits rapid expansion Tuesday, opening its newest location in the men’s room of anexisting Starbucks (TheOnion, 1998).”Schultz was undeterred by critics. Reflecting on the company’s growth in 1998, hecommented,Customers don’t always know what they want. The decline in coffee drinking [in theyears before Starbucks existed] was due to the fact that most of the coffee peoplebought was stale and they weren’t enjoying it. Once they tasted ours and experiencedwhat we call “the third place” … a gathering place between home and work where theyPage 8 of 22were treated with respect… they found we were filling a need they didn’t know theyhad (Smith, 1998).In conjunction with this expansion, Starbucks made some operational changes. First,the La Marzocco espresso machines Starbucks had used since its inception werereplaced with pushbutton Verismo models. This decision simplified the hiring andtraining of baristas since the Verismo machines produced a uniform product with lessoperator training. They also reduced the time to pull an espresso shot from sixtyseconds to thirty-six seconds, helping stores meet the company’s stated goal ofserving every customer within three minutes (Smith, 1998).On the other hand, the height of the Verismo machines’ grinding apparatus blockedthe customer’s view of the barista, and the simplicity of the machine eliminated muchof the romance and theatre that accompanied a barista’s customized preparation ofeach order. Some long-time customers insisted that the new machines producedinferior espresso.Another change involved the coffee beans. Delivering a consistent Starbucks flavourrequired that the beans be roasted centrally and distributed to the global network ofstores. There they were ground just before brewing in order to preserve the volatileoils that produced the best-tasting— and smelling—coffee. However, measuring andgrinding beans for every pot of coffee was time consuming and hampered a store’sability to meet the three-minute service goal. As a result, Starbucks stopped shippingcoffee to its stores as whole beans to be ground throughout the day and insteadshipped air-tight packs of pre-ground beans that it claimed would maintain their flavourfor one year (Simon, 2009).In addition to these easily observable changes, one observer suggested that as itexpanded, Starbucks “skimped on quality [of the coffee beans it purchased] knowingthat its trademark dark, smoky roast covered up imperfections, (Simon, 2009)” andPage 9 of 22added: “In its mission statement, Starbucks pledged to serve the ‘finest coffee in theworld,’ but its need for mountains of beans have made this impossible (Simon, 2009)”The look and feel of the stores were also affected by the dramatic growth in theirnumbers. In order to lower store-opening costs, in 1996 Starbucks limited new storesto four standardized design templates, each of which allowed for limited variation inmaterials and details (Thompson and Gamble, 2010).Growth also exposed weaknesses in operations and supply chain management.Stores regularly ran out of ingredients—such as flavoured syrups and bananas—thatwere necessary to meet customer demand. Merchandise displays in the stores wereinconsistent—even as Starbucks expanded the variety of non-coffee merchandise itsold, some of its stores did not carry basic coffee-making items such as filters andFrench presses. According to Schultz, “in 2008 the chance of a store gettingeverything it asked for on time and intact was about 35 percent, and it was highly likelythat every day, thousands of stores were out of something (Schultz, and Gordon,2011).”Information technology was much the same. Each store had a computer in its office,but it generally could not run spreadsheet software, access the Internet, easily sende-mails outside of the company, or send or receive e-mail attachments (Schultz, andGordon, 2011). The lack of Internet connectivity as late as 2008 was particularly ironicgiven Starbucks’ popularity among its customers as a Wi-Fi hotspot. Cash registersran MS-DOS software that required drinks to be entered in a predetermined order:size, drink name, and then additions such as syrup or an extra shot of espresso. Anydeviations to this sequence required the entire sale to be voided and re-entered(Schultz, and Gordon, 2011).Page 10 of 22The Rise of Competitors (2006–2008)The expansion of Starbucks was good for the coffeehouse industry in the UnitedStates, a phenomenon dubbed the “Starbucks Effect (Vishwanath, and Harding,2000).” By 2006 there were approximately 24,000 specialty coffee establishments inthe United States, nearly 60 percent of which were independently owned and operated(having three or fewer outlets).Independent coffee shops often differentiated themselves from Starbucks by servingcoffee that was handcrafted by expert baristas. Michael Philips, a barista for Chicagobased Intelligentsia coffee and the winner of the 11th Annual World Barista Challenge,compared himself to a cross between a bartender and a sommelier. Baristas atIntelligentsia trained between two and five months before they were allowed to servecoffee; by contrast, baristas at Starbucks typically had two weeks of training. Philipsderisively referred to Starbucks employees as “button pushers” who were “no differentfrom fry chefs at McDonald’s (Elejalde-Ruizc, 2008).”At these coffeehouses, customers waited for their drinks for much longer thanStarbucks’ stated three-minute goal; for example, brewing individual cups of coffee toorder required at least six minutes per cup. Some of these competitors also roastedtheir coffee beans inside the store (Allison, 2009). Prices were often significantlyhigher than those at Starbucks.Starbucks also found itself competing against smaller chains that resembled preexpansion Starbucks stores, complete with manual espresso machines and handscooped coffee. These chains—including Peet’s Coffee and Tea (which featured LaMarzocco manual espresso machines in many stores), the Coffee Bean & Tea Leaf,and Caribou Coffee—operated between 150 and 500 stores, but customers seemedto perceive them more like independent coffeehouses. When Caribou Coffee wasforced to close in Ann Arbor, Michigan, as a result of escalating rent, one patronPage 11 of 22claimed it was “like the end of Ann Arbor (Wenzel, 2001).” By contrast, Starbucks wasoften perceived as a heartless corporate predator. As one observer noted, “For agrowing slice of the population, ‘Wal-Mart,’ ‘Starbucks’ and ‘chain’ have become dirtywords, while local, independent and unique have become core values (Daley, 2009).”Similar to independent coffee retailers, these small chains charged prices about 10percent higher than Starbucks locations in the same geographic area.At the other end of the market, fast food restaurants such as Dunkin’ Donuts andMcDonald’s had started offering specialty coffee. Dunkin’ Donuts, which had enjoyeda loyal coffee following since its inception in 1948, was described by one expert as a“coffee company disguised as a donut company (Pendergrast, 1999).” By 2009, 80percent of McDonald’s outlets in the United States were serving cappuccinos andespresso drinks, supported by aggressive advertising, including billboards that read“Four Bucks is Dumb” and “Large is the New Grande.” Surveys by one restaurantanalyst conducted shortly after McDonald’s began selling coffee suggested that 60percent of Starbucks customers would “trade down” to McDonald’s coffee if it werefaster and cheaper (Gregory, 2009). The McDonald’s product was competitive fromthe standpoint of taste—in February 2007 it won a taste test against Starbucks andDunkin’ Donuts conducted by Consumer Reports (Says, 2007). McDonald’s andDunkin’ Donuts offered prices 9 to 17 percent lower than those of Starbucks.The competitive position facing Starbucks did not go unnoticed by its management. Ina Harvard Business Review article, Schultz wrote,Big-time people began to notice this coffee business is a good business and highlyprofitable. McDonald’s and Dunkin’ Donuts were on the very low end…. [A]t the higherend were the independents that went to school on Starbucks. And there was thisfeeling of ‘let’s support the local companies.’ So, Starbucks was being squeezed tothe middle, and that is an undesirable place for us to be (Ignatius, 2010).Page 12 of 22Starbucks’ Financial Crisis (2008)In 2008, Starbucks wasn’t sure that its supply chain was meeting that goal. One cluethat things were not quite right: the company’s operational costs were rising eventhough sales were cooling. Between October 2007 and October 2008, for example,supply chain expenses in the United States rose from US $750 million to more thanUS $825 million, yet sales for U.S. stores that had been open for at least one yeardropped by 10 percent during that same period.In part, Starbucks was a victim of its own success. Because the company was openingstores around the world at a rapid pace, the supply chain organization had to focus onkeeping up with that expansion. “We had been growing so fast that we had not donea good enough job of getting the [supply chain] fundamentals in place,” says Peter D.Gibbons, executive vice president of global supply chain operations. As a result, hesays, “the costs of running the supply chain—the operating expenses—were risingvery steeply.”To hold those expenses in check and achieve a balance between cost andperformance, Starbucks would have to make significant changes to its operations.Here is a look at the steps Gibbons and his colleagues took and the results theyachieved.Schultz Returns as CEO (2008)On January 7, Schultz returned to Starbucks as CEO at the request of the board ofdirectors. He immediately announced a “transformational agenda” of strategicinitiatives to revitalize the company with which he was so closely identified.Howard Schultz tapped Gibbons, who was then senior vice president of globalmanufacturing operations, to run the company’s supply chain. This was a familiar rolePage 13 of 22for Gibbons; prior to joining Starbucks in 2007, he had been executive vice presidentof supply chain for The Glidden Co., a subsidiary of ICI Americas Inc.The first two things, Gibbons did in his new position were assess how well the supplychain was serving stores and find out where costs were coming from. He soon learnedthat less than half of store deliveries were arriving on time. “My quick diagnosis was… that we were not spending enough attention on how good we were at deliveringservice to stores,” he recalls. Following that assessment, Gibbons began visitingStarbucks’ retail stores to see the situation for himself and get input from employees.“The visits were made to confirm that our supply chain could improve significantly,” heexplains. “The best people to judge the need for change were those at the customerfacing part of our business.”A cost analysis revealed excessive outlays for outsourcing; 65 to 70 percent ofStarbucks’ supply chain operating expenses were tied to outsourcing agreements fortransportation, third-party logistics, and contract manufacturing. “Outsourcing hadbeen used to allow the supply chain to expand rapidly to keep up with store openings,but outsourcing had also led to significant cost inflation,” Gibbons observes.In response to those findings, Gibbons and his leadership team devised a three-stepsupply chain transformation plan and presented it to Starbucks’ board of directors.Under that plan, the company would first reorganize its supply chain organization,simplifying its structure and more clearly defining functional roles. Next, Starbuckswould focus on reducing the cost to serve its stores while improving its day-to-daysupply chain execution. Once these supply chain fundamentals were firmly undercontrol, the company could then lay the foundation for improved supply chaincapability for the future.Page 14 of 22Simplifying The Complex (2008 – 2011)The first step of the transformation plan, reorganizing Starbucks’ supply chainorganization, got under way in late 2008. According to Gibbons, that involved taking acomplex structure and simplifying it so that every job fell into one of the four basicsupply chain functions: plan, source, make, and deliver. For instance, anybodyinvolved in planning—be it production planning, replenishment, or new productlaunches—was placed in the planning group. Sourcing activities were grouped intotwo areas: coffee and “non-coffee” procurement. (Starbucks spends US $600 millionon coffee each year. Purchases of other items, such as dairy products, baked goods,store furniture, and paper goods, total US $2.5 billion annually.) All manufacturing,whether done in-house or by contract manufacturers, was assigned to the “make”functional unit. And finally, all personnel working in transportation, distribution, andcustomer service were assigned to the “deliver” group.After the supply chain functions were reorganized, the various departments turnedtheir attention to the second objective of the supply chain transformation: reducingcosts and improving efficiencies. As part of that effort, the sourcing group worked onidentifying the cost drivers that were pushing up prices. “We went out to understandthe contracts we had, the prices we were paying, and the shipping costs, and webegan breaking items down by ingredient rather than just purchase price,” Gibbonssays. “We built more effective ‘should cost’ models, including benchmarkingingredients and processes, which showed that we could negotiate better prices.”Meanwhile, the manufacturing group developed a more efficient model for deliveringcoffee beans to its processing plants, with the goal of manufacturing in the regionwhere the product is sold. Starbucks already owned three coffee plants in the UnitedStates, in Kent, Washington; Minden, Nevada; and York, Pennsylvania. In 2009, thecompany added a fourth U.S. plant, in Columbia, South Carolina. The benefits of thatapproach were quickly apparent; regionalizing its coffee production allowed StarbucksPage 15 of 22to reduce its transportation costs and lead times, says Gibbons. Moreover, once thenew facility was up and running, all of the U.S. coffee plants were able to switch fromseven-day operations to five days.In addition to the four coffee facilities it owns in the United States, Starbucks alsooperates a coffee plant in Amsterdam, the Netherlands, and a processing plant for itsTazo Tea subsidiary in Portland, Oregon. The company also relies on 24 comanufacturers, most of them in Europe, Asia, Latin America, and Canada.Even though it spread production across a wide territory, transportation, distribution,and logistics made up the bulk of Starbucks’ operating expenses because thecompany ships so many different products around the world. Getting that under controlpresented a daunting challenge for the supply chain group. “Whether coffee fromAfrica or merchandise from China, [our task was to integrate] that together into oneglobal logistics system, the combined physical movement of all incoming and outgoinggoods,” says Gibbons. “It’s a big deal because there’s so much spend there, and somuch of our service depends on that. … With 70,000 to 80,000 deliveries per weekplus all the inbound shipments from around the world, we want to manage theselogistics in one system.”Earning The Company’s Confidence (2011 and beyond)Since Starbucks began its supply chain transformation effort, it has curtailed costsworldwide without compromising service delivery. “As a company,” Gibbons says, “wehave talked publicly of over $500 million of savings in the last two years, and the supplychain has been a major contributor to that.”In Gibbons’ eyes, the transformation effort has been a success. “Today there’s a lot ofconfidence in our supply chain to execute every day, to make 70,000 deliveries aPage 16 of 22week, to get new products to market, and to manage product transitions, new productintroductions, and promotions,” he says. “There’s a lot of confidence that we now arefocused on service and quality to provide what our stores need and what our otherbusiness customers need.”To sustain that momentum for improvement and to ensure a future flow of talent intothe organization, Starbucks recently began an initiative to recruit top graduates ofsupply chain education programs. Along with its recruiting program, the companyplans to provide ongoing training for its existing employees to help them furtherdevelop their supply chain knowledge and skills. “We want to make sure we havethought leaders [in our supply chain organization],” Gibbons says. Starbucksconsiders this initiative to be so important, in fact, that Gibbons now spends 40 to 50percent of his time on developing, hiring, and retaining supply chain talent.The infusion of new recruits will allow Starbucks to stay focused on its supply chainmission of delivering products with a high level of service at the lowest possible costto its stores in the United States and around the globe. As Gibbons observes, “No oneis going to listen to us talking about supply chain strategy if we can’t deliver service,quality, and cost on a daily basis.”Today, with more than 32,000 stores in 80 countries, Starbucks is the premier roasterand retailer of specialty coffee in the world. And with every cup, we strive to bring bothPage 17 of 22our heritage and an exceptional experience to life. This is all from the humble beginningwhen Starbucks set out to be a different kind of company. One that not only celebratedcoffee and the rich tradition, but that also brought a feeling of connection.Their mission was and will always aim to inspire and nurture the human spirit – oneperson, one cup, and one neighbourhood at a time.Page 18 of 22ReferencesAllBusiness (1998). “Partners in Supermarkets: Maxwell House & Starbucks”. Teaand Coffee Trade Journal, November 1, 1998. [online]. Available onhttp://www.allbusiness.com/manufacturing/food-manufacturing-food-coffeetea/727029-1.html [Accessed 12 June 2000]Allison, M. (2009). “Should Coffeehouses Roast Their Own Beans?”. Seattle Times,June 26, 2009.Brooks, D., (2001). Bobos in Paradise: The New Upper Class and How They GotThere. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster.Chu, D., (2020). Why A Starbucks-Kraft Feud Will Be Costly For Both Companies.EconMatters Business Insider blog. [blog], December 14, 2010, [online]. Available onhttp://www.businessinsider.com/starbucks-kraft-2010-12 [Accessed 20 June 2020]Daley, J. (2009). “That’s a Starbucks?” Entrepreneur, November 2009, 93.Elejalde-Ruizc, A. (2008). “Not Your Average Joes,” Chicago Tribune, April 28, 2008Frei, F., (2006), “Breaking the Trade-Off Between Efficiency and Service,” HarvardBusiness Review 84, no. 11 (November 2006): 92–101.Gregory, S., (2009). “Latte with Fries? McDonald’s Takes Aim at Starbucks,” Time,May 7, 2009Ignatius, A., (2010). “We Had to Own the Mistakes, Interview with Howard Schultz,”Harvard Business Review, July 2010.McDonalds (2007). McDonald’s Annual Report 2007. New York, McDonaldsMiller, C. (2011). “A Changed Starbucks. A Changed C.E.O.,” New York Times,March 13, 2011Page 19 of 22Oldenburg R., (1999). The Great Good Place: Cafes, Coffee Shops, Bookstores,Bars, Hair Salons, and Other Hangouts at the Heart of a Community, 3rd ed.Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press.Pendergrast, M.(1999). Uncommon Grounds: The History of Coffee and How ItTransformed Our World New York, NY: Basic Books, pp 378Says (2007). McDonald’s Coffee Beats Starbucks, Says Consumer Reports,” SeattleTimes, February 2, 2007.Schultz, H. and Gordon, J. (2011). Onward: How Starbucks Fought for Its Lifewithout Losing Its Soul. New York, NY: Rodale Books, pp. 186Simon, B. (2009). Everything But the Coffee: Learning about America fromStarbucks. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Pp. 11Smith, S., (1998). “Grounds for Success (Interview with Howard Schultz),”Entrepreneur, May 1998, 120.Starbucks Corporation – IR Home (2021). StarBucks Ivestor Relationships. [online].Available at https://investor.starbucks.com/ir-home/default.aspx [Accessed 25 Sep2020]Starbucks (2008). Starbucks Annual Report 2008: Fiscal 2008 Financial Highlights.New York, StarbucksTheFreeLibrary (1998). “Partners in Supermarkets: Maxwell House & Starbucks,”Tea and Coffee Trade Journal, November 1, 1998. [Online]Available onhttps://www.thefreelibrary.com/More+than+politics+can+make+strange+bedfellows.-a053392918 [Accessed 20 June 2000]Theodore, S., (2007). “Starbucks Brews New Coffee Concepts,” Beverage Industry98, (11) (November 2007): pp. 30–34.Page 20 of 22TheOnion (1998). “New Starbucks Opens in Rest Room of Existing Starbucks,” TheOnion, June 27, 1998, [online]. Availablehttp://www.theonion.com/articles/newstarbucks-opens-in-rest-room-of-existing-starb.[Accessed on 20 June 2000]Thompson A. and Gamble J. (2010). “Starbucks Case Study,” McGraw Hill, [online].Availablehttp://www.mhhe.com/business/management/thompson/11e/case/starbucks.html/

YOU MAY ALSO READ ...  Hospice goes hollywood-problem solving | Management homework help

Assignment status: Already Solved By Our Experts

(USA, AUS, UK & CA Ph. D. Writers)

CLICK HERE TO GET A PROFESSIONAL WRITER TO WORK ON THIS PAPER AND OTHER SIMILAR PAPERS, GET A NON PLAGIARIZED PAPER FROM OUR EXPERTS

Order from Australian Expert Writers
Best Australian Academic Writers

QUALITY: 100% ORIGINAL PAPER – NO PLAGIARISM – CUSTOM PAPER